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EVICTION FREE ZONES: THE ECONOMICS OF
LEGAL BRICOLAGE IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST DISPLACEMENT
Lawrence K Kolodney*
[I]n The Savage Mind, Levi-Strauss presents . . . what he calls
bricolage .... The bricoleur, says Levi-Strauss, is someone who
uses "the means at hand," that is, the instruments he finds at his
disposition around him, those which are already there, which had
not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for
which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error
to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears
necessary.'
Nearly two years ago, community groups declared a 52-block
area along Washington Street [in Boston] an "eviction-free zone."
The area is bounded by Egleston Square, Franklin Park, Green
Street and the new Orange Line [subway], and includes 2,000
apartments and 8,000 residents, 70 percent of whom live in house-
holds with annual incomes of less than $15,000.
Since then, community groups spearheaded by City Life have
led a grass-roots effort to prevent displacement by educating resi-
dents in the zone about tenants' rights and providing legal assist-
ance to people facing eviction. "Although there have been losses
we've also had our fair share of victories," said Kieffer, a tenant, as
he sat in front of a large map of the "eviction-free zone."
"Residents are worried about whether they're going to be able to
afford to stay," said Jennifer Roby, a community organizer for the
Egleston Square Neighborhood Association. "The 'eviction-free
zone' is critical. Some of the people moved here from the South
End after they were forced out because of gentrification. They
don't want to see the same thing happen to them again."
* S.B. & S.M. 1987, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1990, Harvard
Law School. The author wishes to thank Duncan Kennedy for his guidance and persis-
tent encouragement. I am also grateful to Joseph B. Lichtblau for extensive editing
assistance beyond the call of duty, and to Darnley D. Stewart and Victoria Kanrek for
their careful readings of earlier drafts.
1. Derrida, Structure, Sign & Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRrr-
ING AND DIFFERENCE 285 (1978).
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"In Jamaica Plain, things are so bad that we have to go house-
by-house and unit-by-unit and save as much as we can," said Ken
Tangvik, chairman of the Housing and Development Committee of
the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Council. "If we can win with one
building, then maybe we can inspire other tenants that they can do
it, too. If you stick together and work hard you can win."2
Introduction
Gentrification, 3 the influx of high-income dwellers4 into low-in-
come neighborhoods, has in the past decade become a serious cause of
concern to low-income tenants in older American cities. Although
gentrification has had some positive effects, one important negative
effect has been the displacement of existing neighborhood residents.
Various schemes have been suggested to combat displacement caused
by gentrification. One strategy entails seeking legislative relief in the
form of rent control and condominium-conversion laws to directly
curb the influx of high-income residents; another makes use of rent
vouchers and public housing to ameliorate the effects of
displacement.5
This Article analyzes an alternative strategy: the use of Eviction'
Free Zones (EFZs) to prevent the displacement of low-income tenants
in gentrifying neighborhoods. In contrast to strategies that rely on
legislative intervention, the EFZ strategy can be applied directly in
the neighborhood, by local community groups and legal services law-
yers, through enforcement of the implied warranty of habitability
(IWH) and other legal remedies already available to tenants. To cre-
ate an EFZ, local community groups and legal services lawyers target
a neighborhood on the verge of gentrification, and work with tenants
to prevent or delay evictions. Their goal is to make eviction a difficult
and expensive process for landlords, slow gentrification, and ulti-
2. Tenants Hit the Roof Now Might Own It, Boston Globe, May 10, 1989, at 19, col.
3.
3. See generally N. SMITH & P. WILLIAMS, GENTRIFICATION OF THE CITY (1986).
According to Neil Smith, the term for this phenomenon in Australia is, aptly, "trendifica-
tion." See Smith, Gentrification and Uneven Development, 58 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 139,
n.1 (1982) [hereinafter Smith].
4. The term gentrification is a misnomer. It is not the "gentry" who inhabit gentri-
fled neighborhoods, but rather people who might appropriately be referred to as "yup-
pies" or, according to one report, "hipeoisie." See Smith, supra note 3. The relevant
characteristics of this group are their youth, high incomes, superior education and profes-
sional careers. For the sake of precision, this Article will generally refer to them as "gen-
triflers" or "potential gentrifiers."
5. See C. HARTMAN, D. KEATING & R. LEGATES, DISPLACEMENT: How TO
FIGHT IT (1982).
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mately block displacement. In the long run, the EFZ strategy may
benefit poor tenants by maintaining both the quantity and af-
fordability of existing low-income housing.
Part I of this Article discusses gentrification and the social
problems associated with it. Part II describes the mechanics of the
EFZ strategy: the legal tools for preventing evictions, how they are
used, and by whom. Part III analyzes, through the use of an eco-
nomic model, the potential long-run economic impact of the EFZ
strategy and discusses, in terms of this model, when and how an EFZ
should be put into effect. The Article concludes that Eviction Free
Zones can, under certain circumstances, be an effective strategy for
community activists and legal services lawyers to combat the destruc-
tive effects of gentrification.
I. The Problematic Nature of Gentrification
A. The "Good Old Days": Urban Expansion and Residential
Filtering
During the first half of this century, when urban areas were steadily
expanding, the demographic trend was away from the city center.
The wealthy were concentrated on the outskirts of the city while the
poor occupied the innermost urban neighborhoods. One explanation
for this pattern of settlement is that housing stock "filtered" down
from wealthy home owners to the poor; as new, high-quality housing
was created, each family "filtered up" and their former housing
"filtered down" to a lower income family. In practice, "filtering up"
meant moving to a larger house with more open space, further from
the city center.6 Thus, the filtering model explains a pattern of resi-
dential settlement in which long-term, wealthy residents came to oc-
cupy country estates on the urban periphery, newly arrived
immigrants occupied rundown tenements in the central city, and the
intermediate classes filled the remaining space.7 Some theorists have
suggested that this process was an efficient method for providing the
best possible housing for all economic classes, although this view has
6. See generally HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 161 (R.
Montgomery & D. Mandelker 2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter Montgomery & Mandelker] (pro-
viding a brief overview of the filtering model).
An excellent study of the filtering phenomenon in Boston is presented in S. WARNER,
STREETCAR SUBURBS (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter STREETCAR SUBURBS]. Warner de-
scribes the ways in which housing patterns in Boston tended to follow the newly extended
streetcar lines, which made it feasible to live further and further from the central business
district.
7. See STREETCAR SUBURBS, supra note 6, at 154-66.
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been challenged by more recent commentators.8
Because of demographic changes,9 the steady outward growth pre-
dicted by the filtering model has abated in many American cities. In
these areas, a new pattern, a kind of reverse filtering or "gentrifica-
tion," has come to characterize residential settlement.
B. Gentrification: Reverse Filtering in the Inner City
Gentrification is the process whereby low-income neighborhoods
are made attractive to high-income residents.10 Notwithstanding its
8. The traditional analysis views filtering as a positive phenomenon that provides a
steady flow of better quality housing for all families, as those on the top rung expand into
the newest highest-quality units. See Smith, Filtering and Neighborhood Change, in
Montgomery & Mandelker, supra note 6, at 162. But see Edel, Filtering in a Private
Housing Market, in Montgomery & Mandelker, supra note 6, at 172 (claiming that filter-
ing can actually have negative effects on neighborhoods, requiring residents to buy more
expensive housing on the "next rung" just to maintain their existing quality of life).
9. See Alonso, The Population Factor and Urban Structure, in PROSPECTIVE CITY
32 (A. Solomon ed. 1980) [hereinafter Alonso]; P. Levine & L. Ontijes, Gentrification and
Abandonment: The Effect of Deindustrialization, Service Sector Growth, and Market
Failure on the Housing Stock (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (on fie with Prof.
Duncan Kennedy, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Levine and Ontjes]; Mankiw &
Weil, The Baby Boom, the Baby Bust and the Housing Market, 19 REGIONAL SCI. AND
URB. ECON. 235, 235-38 (1989) [hereinafter Baby Bust].
10. A number of demographic factors have contributed to the phenomenon of gen-
trification. One such factor is the growth of the post-industrial economy. See Reich, The
Real Economy, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 1991, at 35 (describing the overshadowing of manu-
facturing by information-oriented businesses in the world economy). In many cities,
high-paying job opportunities in the finance, insurance and real estate fields (the "FIRE"
sector) have developed. This change in employment demographics has created an eco-
nomic barrier to further outward expansion into the suburbs, thus facilitating gentrifica-
tion. Levine & Ontjes, supra note 9, at 9-10. Finally, a significant demographic change in
the family characteristics of new home buyers has contributed to the process of gentrifica-
tion. The traditional new home buyer, a young family with children, has been rivaled by
the tremendous increase in single person households and childless couples. See Baby
Bust, supra note 9 (analyzing the relationship between baby booms and housing demand);
Alonso, supra note 9 (arguing that gentrification is the product of the baby-boomer lifes-
tyle, that is, postponing marriage and childraising in favor of city-based professional ful-
fillment and resulting in smaller urban family size and a demand for more high quality
urban housing units). This "yuppie" phenomenon has expanded as young, educated pro-
fessionals defer family life in lieu of careers.
See generally Beauregard, The Chaos and Complexity of Gentrification, in N. SMITH &
P. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 35 [hereinafter Beauregard]; Feagin, Urban Real Estate
Speculation in the United States: Implications for Social Science and Urban Planning, in
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 99 (R. Bratt, C. Hartman & A. Meyerson eds.
1986) (describing the economic conditions which lead to gentrification); Durham & Shel-
don, Mitigating the Effects of Private Revitalization on Housing for the Poor, 70 MARQ. L.
REv. 1 (1986) (describing the social costs of gentrification-caused displacement and sug-
gesting limited rent control, tax relief and payments to displaced tenants as mitigating
responses) [hereinafter Durham & Sheldon]; Marcuse, To Control Gentrification: Anti-
Displacement Zoning and Planning for Stable Residential Districts, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOc. CHANGE 931 (1985) [hereinafter Anti-Displacement Zoning] (describing the effects
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positive effects, 1I one negative result of gentrification is that the origi-
nal, low-income tenants of the neighborhood are displaced.' 2 Indeed,
the displacement of low-income tenants is a necessary step in the gen-
trification process. In a gentrified neighborhood, existing low-income
housing "filters up" to incoming wealthy tenants.
Gentrification sets in motion several forces which lead to displace-
ment. At the outset, there is an incentive for landlords in a gentrify-
ing neighborhood to turn a profit by converting (low amenity, high
density) rental units into (high amenity, low density) condominiums
or luxury rental units. When the time is ripe for conversion, land-
lords may refuse to renew existing leases or offer new leases at unaf-
fordable rents. In jurisdictions where tenants may not be evicted at
will,' 3 landlords may employ more informal techniques of eviction,
such as physically threatening tenants, discontinuing utilities, or
"warehousing" 14 adjacent units. A landlord may also cease to main-
tain a building with the expectation that it will eventually be con-
verted into high-income housing. Thus, tenants may be displaced
directly by eviction, or indirectly by "voluntary" abandonment of
their homes because of increasing rents, deteriorating conditions, or
intimidation.'"
of gentrification in New York City, its ability to exist side-by-side with abandonment, and
proposing comprehensive "anti-displacement zoning" measures as a response); Marcuse,
Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections, Causes, and Policy Re-
sponses in New York City, 28 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195 (1985) [hereinafter
Connections] (a more theoretical treatment of the same subject).
11. See Durham & Sheldon, supra note 10. This article cites numerous positive por-
trayals of gentrification in the popular press. See also Kamer, Conversion of Rental Hous-
ing to Unit Ownership - A Noncrisis, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 187, 203 (1982) (arguing that
the damage caused by condominium conversion to the stock of rental housing has been
"limited" and "not as extensive as the popular press would lead readers to believe").
12. See Durham & Sheldon, supra note 10, at 13.
13. Low-income tenancies are typically "at-will." A tenant-at-will does not rent for a
fixed period. Instead, the tenancy continues every month that rent is received, but may
be terminated by either party on short notice. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.6 (1976).
In New Jersey, and in some cities with rent control, tenancies may only be terminated
for "good cause." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); Church
v. City of Boston, 370 Mass. 598, 351 N.E.2d 212 (1976).
14. Warehousing is a technique used by landlords of affordable housing who wish to
convert their property to another use. When a tenant moves out, the landlord will keep
the unit off the market. As more and more tenants leave, the building becomes emptier
and less appealing to the remaining residents, encouraging them to leave as well. Ware-
housing causes the landlord to lose some rental income, but may be worth the effort if it
allows for quick conversion when legal, economic, or physical conditions are favorable.
This tactic is preferred in "just cause" eviction jurisdictions, where short notice eviction
of tenants might not otherwise be possible. Apfelberg v. East 56th Plaza, 106 Misc. 2d
295, 297-98 n.*, 431 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623-24 n.1 (1980).
15. Displacement may have long term consequences for its victims. Losing one's
1991]
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Landlords who do not intend to convert have some incentive to
increase rents. First, incoming wealthy tenants may be willing to pay
higher rents for apartments with relatively few amenities, merely for
the convenience of proximity to the urban center. Second, as a neigh-
borhood gentrifies, real estate speculation 6 may increase the value of
all units, thereby driving up property taxes, a cost likely to be passed
on to existing tenants.
Even tenants who are not displaced may suffer from the increased
cost of living in their now high-income neighborhood. For example,
the cost of food and other sundries often increases as neighborhood
businesses begin to cater to a more affluent clientele. This is not to
mention the intangible cost to tenants of losing their familiar neigh-
borhood milieu.17
Thus, gentrification leads to "involuntary reverse filtering": as
housing prices and costs of living increase, low-income units "filter
up" to high-income tenants. Those tenants who survive the threat of
displacement still face a higher cost of living in exchange for a small
or unwanted increase in perceived quality of life. Low-income city
dwellers, at one time the victims of mere neglect, must now also con-
tend with the prospect of losing home and neighborhood to a gentrify-
ing class. Today's urban poor cannot limit their task to improving the
conditions around them; they must develop strategies for defending
themselves against the destructive effects of gentrification."8
home and neighborhood may result in the destruction of emotional support networks.
See A. MCCOLLUM, THE TRAUMA OF MOVING: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES FOR WOMEN
(1990). This psychological effect may be compounded by economic concerns. In a tight
housing market, replacement housing is likely to cost more. Finally, gentrification may
eliminate stable poor neighborhoods entirely, depriving the poor of a vital support struc-
ture.
See also Michelson, Residential Mobility and Urban Policy: Some Sociological Consid-
erations, in RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 79, 83-85 (W. Clark & E.
Moore eds. 1980).
16. Investors or landlords, suspecting that a building in a gentrifying neighborhood
will eventually be able to attract a higher rent, will pay more for the building. This type
of speculation, however, may become a financial burden for the investor who has paid a
premium, but who must wait for existing tenants to vacate before converting.
17. One commentator has noted that, while gentrification is often considered to be
synonymous with "revitalization," the gentrification process can actually result in a kind
of de-vitalization. "Open doors, street games, and stoop-sitting are replaced with iron
bars, guard dogs, high wooden fences, and a scorn for the streets." Smith, supra note 4.
18. See Connections, supra note 10, at 212-17 (estimating 10,000 to 40,000 affordable
households lost every year in New York City to gentrification).
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II. Eviction Free Zones: Legal Bricolage in an Era of Limited
Political Expectations
Although there are a number of ways to control the impact of gen-
trification on low-income renters, such as rent control19 and condo-
minium conversion laws2" (which make it illegal for landlords to
transform affordable housing into gentrified stock),2 1 this Article as-
sumes that in most areas of the country such measures are not politi-
cally feasible. It also assumes that low-income tenants will continue
to live in privately owned, non-rent-controlled housing, and pay mar-
ket rents. Finally, it assumes that many existing tenant rights against
the landlord, such as the IWH, are not widely enforced.22 Under such
19. See Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing
Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988).
20. Condominium conversion control is an essential feature of an anti-gentrification
rent control ordinance. See id. at 1842. Without condominium conversion controls,
landlords can circumvent rent control by selling condominiums to owner occupants, thus
removing them from the rental housing market. See Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383
Mass. 152, 158, 418 N.E.2d 335, 338-39 (1981).
21. An even more comprehensive solution would involve changes in public policy
favoring the creation of a significant "social housing sector." The existence of such a
sector, consisting of high-quality public housing and limited equity co-operatives built by
government or non-profit agencies, would render low-income tenants immune from mar-
ket forces that drive the gentrification process. See J. GILDERBLOOM & R. APPELBAUM,
RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 150-74 (1988) [hereinafter RETHINKING RENTAL
HOUSING].
Contrary to the popular conception, not all public housing is dysfunctional. See id. at
17-28. Because rents in public housing developments are indexed to tenant income, ten-
ants who live in public housing enjoy a high degree of certainty about future housing
costs. They lack, however, the advantages of control that come with ownership.
In a limited equity co-operative, the building is owned co-operatively by the tenants.
Each tenant buys a share upon taking up residence. Unlike traditional co-operatives,
tenants in limited equity co-operatives are bound by a covenant requiring them to resell
their share to the co-operative upon vacating their unit, with the resale price limited by a
yearly interest formula. In this way, tenants receive the advantages of ownership and the
units are protected from future speculative pressures, thus maintaining the supply of af-
fordable housing.
22. This assumption appears justified both by studies of housing conditions, see infra
note 25, and by studies of legal actions taken by tenants to enforce the IWH. For exam-
ple, in Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Practice, 28
STAN. L. REV. 729 (1976) [hereinafter Great Green Hope], the authors conducted a sur-
vey of the impact of California's IWH on litigation in the San Francisco municipal court.
They found that the IWH is not extensively used as a defense against unlawful detainer
actions, primarily because of the lack of legal representation for tenants. Even where it
was used as a defense, it rarely led to improvement of the premises. Significantly, though
the authors conclude that "if the implied warranty of habitability is intended to shift
some bargaining power from landlords to tenants in litigation, the rule has had some
success." Id. at 776. Thus, as of the time of this study, the primary effect of the IWH
probably has not been to improve housing quality, but rather to give tenants more
favorable results in landlord-tenant litigation. See also Hirsch, Hirsch, & Margolis, Re-
gression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation
1991]
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circumstances, an EFZ strategy might be the best alternative available
to community activists seeking to prevent displacement.
An Eviction Free Zone begins with the public declaration by a
community group or legal services provider of an all-out effort to re-
sist evictions within a particular neighborhood. The neighborhood
chosen is one in which the early seeds of gentrification have begun to
take root. Resistance appears in a variety of forms, including picket-
ing, negative publicity for landlords and the formation of tenant un-
ions. The essence of the EFZ strategy, however, is vigorous legal
defense against evictions.
The primary tool of the EFZ is selective enforcement of the non-
waivable implied warranty of habitability (IWH). The IWH requires
that landlords maintain residential housing units in "habitable"2 con-
on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1098 (1975) (arguing from nation-
wide survey data that tenants generally do not utilize their warranty remedies because
they fear an ensuing rent increase) [hereinafter Hirsch]. Compare Heskin, The Warranty
of Habitability Debate: A California Case Study, 63 CAL. L. REV. 37 (1978) (contra-
dicting Great Green Hope claims in a study of a Los Angeles neighborhood which found
that where tenants had access to legal services lawyers, they were willing to enforce the
warranty.
23. Standards of habitability vary from area to area. The Uniform Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act describes the landlord's duties as follows:
(a) A landlord shall
(1) comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes
materially affecting health and safety;
(2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the prem-
ises in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition;
(4) maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities
and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him;
(5) provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for the
removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the occupancy
of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal; and
(6) supply running water and reasonable amount of hot water at all times
and reasonable heat [between [October 1] and [May 1]] except where the build-
ing that includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped for that
purpose, or the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is gener-
ated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant and supplied by
a direct public utility connection.
(b) If the duty imposed by paragraph (1) of subsection (a) is greater than any
duty imposed by any other paragraph of that subsection, the landlord's duty
shall be determined by reference to paragraph (1) of subsection (a).
(c) The landlord and tenant of a single family residence may agree in writing
that the tenant perform the landlord's duties specified in paragraphs (5) and (6)
of subsection (a) and also specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, and
remodeling, but only if the transaction is entered into in good faith and not for
the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord.
(d) The landlord and tenant of any dwelling unit other than a single family
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dition; breach of the IWH gives rise to a legal defense or counterclaim
against eviction.24 Because many landlords in low-income areas do
not maintain their buildings according to every technical requirement
of local housing codes,23 tenants in these buildings often have an in-
cipient legal defense against eviction. When used strategically as part
of an EFZ, this defense can significantly raise the expense and effort
involved in evicting tenants.
Prior to 1970, tenants had little legal clout in opposing their land-
lord's power.26 A residential lease, treated as an ordinary tenancy-
for-years, was interpreted under traditional common law property
residence may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs, maintenance
tasks, alterations, or remodeling only if
(1) the agreement of the parties is entered into in good faith and not for the
purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord and is set forth in a separate
writing signed by the parties and supported by adequate consideration;
(2) the work is not necessary to cure noncompliance with subsection (a)(1)
of this section; and
(3) the agreement does not diminish or affect the obligation of the landlord
to other tenants in the premises.
(e) The landlord may not treat performance of the separate agreement de-
scribed in subsection (d) as a condition to any obligation or performance of any
rental agreement.
UNIF. RESID. LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104, 7B U.L.A. 460 (1991).
24. The specific rights of tenants vary from state to state. In Massachusetts, for ex-
ample, breach of the IWH (or any other legal obligation) can be raised as a defense or
counterclaim to an eviction action that is for non-payment of rent or any reason which is
not the fault of the tenant. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 8A (1986). See, e.g., Berman and
Sons v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979) (tenant's obligation to pay full
rent abates as soon as the landlord has notice that premises fail to comply with the re-
quirements of the warranty of habitability).
25. The most recent nationwide housing survey found that 31% of central city rental
housing was in "fair" or "poor" condition. Among residents in the three lowest income
categories, the number was 36%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY 1983: CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, SERIES
H-150-83 INDICATORS OF HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITY BY FINANCIAL
CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONS, B- 121 - B- 131 (1985) [here-
inafter CENSUS REPORT].
In a survey in Boston in 1981, 27% of all rental units were reported to have structural
deficiencies in the building. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY 1981: CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, SERIES H-
170-81-3 HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR SELECTED METROPOLITAN AREAS, F-87 - F-
89 (1984).
In a gentrifying neighborhood, this situation may be exacerbated as landlords neglect
building repairs, in anticipation of the major building renovations that may accompany
gentrification.
26. Some tenant protections existed in theory prior to the late 1960's. See generally,
Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 551-53 (1984) [hereinafter Rabin]; Glendon, The Transforma-
tion of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REv. 503, 524-25 (1982) [hereinafter
Glendon]. These protections, however, were anomalies that had little impact on land-
lord-tenant relations.
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doctrines27 and, accordingly, the landlord's duty to a tenant consisted
only of providing possession of the premises in exchange for rent.
Even if the landlord assumed a contractual duty to make needed re-
pairs, the tenant's duty to pay rent was, nonetheless, an independent
obligation. A tenant had no right to withhold rent for any reason,
and the tenant's sole recourse against a landlord was a suit for
damages.28
This traditional relationship between residential renters and apart-
ment owners underwent three critical evolutionary stages beginning
in the mid-1950's. First, the Housing Act of 195429 made federal de-
velopment aid contingent on the passage of local housing codes.3"
The power to enforce those codes, however, vested not in tenants, but
in city inspectors, who were unable to effect widespread enforcement.
A second milestone occurred when Congress passed the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964,31 creating the predecessor to the Federal
Legal Services Corporation. Through a new legal actor, the poverty
lawyer, low-income Americans gained access to legal remedies previ-
ously available only in theory.
Finally, and most significantly, a series of state court decisions (in-
stigated by poverty lawyers), beginning in 1970 with Javins v. First
National Realty Corp. ,32 expanded the formal rights of residential ten-
ants. In Javins, on appeal from a Washington, D.C. eviction action,
Judge J. Skelly Wright found an implied, non-waivable, common law
"warranty of habitability measured by the standards set out in the
Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, ' ' 33 and held that
the landlord's breach of this warranty was a defense against an evic-
tion action for non-payment of rent. This holding marked a signifi-
cant departure from the previous regime in which tenants were
unconditionally obligated to pay rent irrespective of the condition of
the premises.34
27. Glendon, supra note 26, at 504, 520.
28. Id. at 520.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1970); Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant
Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L. REv. 1, 43 (1976) [hereinafter Abbott].
30. See Rabin, supra note 26, at 551.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970).
32. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
33. Id. at 1072. As one commentator noted, the Javins opinion discarded several
common law rules at once: the landlord's lack of responsibility to the tenant for the
physical conditions of premises; the independence of the tenant's obligation to pay rent
from the landlord's obligations with respect to the premises; and the constructive eviction
requirement that a tenant must vacate the leased premises before asserting defenses based
on the condition of the premises. Glendon, supra note 26, at 521.
34. In a letter to Professor Rabin, Judge Wright wrote: "[M]ost of the tenants in
Washington, D.C. slums were poor and black and most of the landlords were rich and
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A host of similar rulings35 in state courts,36 soon followed Javins,
and legislatures responded by enacting laws formalizing the proce-
dure for enforcing the warranty." The warranty has since become an
established doctrine of modem landlord-tenant law. 38 Today, some
version of the IWH exists in most states and in the District of Colum-
bia. Javins and its progeny gave tenants a powerful tool with which to
enforce housing code standards: the right to condition payment of
rent upon the fulfillment of the landlord's maintenance obligations.
Because of the IWH, many, if not most, low-income tenants can
raise some legal defense39 or counterclaim for damages, to a land-
lord's action for possession of the premises.41 There may also be other
valuable non-warranty defenses, such as improper service of the evic-
white. There is no doubt in my mind that these conditions played a subconscious role in
influencing my landlord and tenant decisions." Letter from Judge J. Skelly Wright to
Edward H. Rabin (October 14, 1982), reprinted in Rabin, supra note 26, at 549.
Judge Wright concluded, "I didn't like what I saw, and I did what I could to amelio-
rate, if not eliminate, the injustice involved in the way many of the poor were required to
live in the nation's capital." Id. Judge Wright admitted ignoring legal precedent but
offered "no apology for not following more closely the legal precedents which had coop-
erated in creating the conditions that I found unjust." Id
35. See Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972);
Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Housing Auth. v. Hem-
mingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213
N.W.2d 339 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Kline v.
Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d
160 (1973); Schaefer v. Murphey, 131 Ariz. 295, 640 P.2d 857 (1982); Breezewood Man-
agement Co. v. Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671
S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
36. At the time, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals served as the highest appellate
court for local cases arising in the District of Columbia.
37. See UNIF. RESID. LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104, 7B U.L.A. 460 (1991);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5 statutory note to
ch. 5, 150-68 (1976).
38. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 233(3) (1968); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD, AND TENANT §§ 5.1-5.6 (1976);
UNIF. RESID. LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104, 7B U.L.A. 460 (1991); UNIF.
REsID. LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.105, 7B U.L.A. 485 (1991).
39. Strictly speaking, the IWH is a defense only if the eviction is for non-payment of
rent, or if it is taking place in a jurisdiction with a "just cause" eviction statute. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991). Most rent control statutes
also have a "just cause" provision. See, eg., 1976 MASS. ACTS ch. 36, § 9.
40. See UNIt. RESID. LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.105, 78 U.L.A. 485 (1991).
But see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (holding that states are not required to
permit counterclaims in an action for possession of the premises).
41. It is a reasonable assumption that a large proportion of low-income tenants facing
eviction will be able to raise significant warranty of habitability defenses. See supra note
21. Census reports of building deterioration may actually underestimate the violations in
a gentrifying neighborhood, since landlords who are planning to convert may in fact
spend less money on current maintenance in an attempt to drive existing tenants out.
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tion notice.42
The goal of activists implementing an EFZ is to use these legal tools
to resist as many evictions as possible and therefore create among
landlords, investors and potential high-income newcomers to the
neighborhood, the perception that many tenants will resist evictions,
and will be costly to remove. It is important to note that in enforcing
an EFZ, legal services attorneys do not apply classical legal analysis,
and instead choose to defend cases based on their likelihood of success
on the merits. The point of the strategy is to launch a form of legal
guerilla warfare. Hence, it may be said that an EFZ uses "legal brico-
lage," in the sense that the lawyer uses any legal means at hand to
bring about the desired result of increasing the time and expense
needed to evict tenants. Rather than employing the IWH and other
defenses in only those cases where the defense is likely to succeed, the
strategy is to mount a legal defense in all cases with a colorable claim,
even cases legally favorable to the landlord. The goal is to force land-
lords to back down before the eviction can be brought to a full trial,
or, at least, make each eviction as costly as possible.
Most states have an expedited procedure for evicting tenants.43 In
Massachusetts, for example, landlords may have a hearing within one
week of filing a complaint.' In a typical case where the tenant is
42. In Massachusetts, for example, the landlord must first terminate the tenancy by
serving a "notice to quit" either fourteen (in the case of nonpayment of rent) or thirty
days prior to initiating an action for possession. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 186, §§ 11-13 (1981
& Supp. 1990). These provisions are strictly construed. See, e.g., Ryan v. Sylvester, 358
Mass. 18, 260 N.E.2d 148 (1970) (holding that improper service of notice to quit results
in a summary judgement for the tenant). See also Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the
only Justice is in the Halls, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 1 (R. Abel ed. 1982),
(describing how legal services lawyers in the Bronx were able to frustrate eviction at-
tempts by pointing out technical defects in landlord's service of process) [hereinafter
Lazerson].
A number of other laws and decisions have empowered the Massachusetts tenant. See
Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 398 N.E.2d 482 (1979) (allowing the tripling
of damages under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act if the landlord's breach of
warranty was willful); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 15B (1981) (requiring landlords to seg-
regate tenant security deposit and to provide interest and an annual accounting, and pro-
viding for three months' rent damages for any breach); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 197
(1981) (making the presence of lead paint in an apartment with children under the age of
six a per se violation of the IWH, and allowing punitive damages for willful refusal to
remove lead paint); Young v. Patukonis, 24 Mass. App. 907, 506 N.E.2d 1164 (1987)
(allowing for damages for a tenant against a landlord who transfers responsibility for the
payment of utilities to the tenant without a written agreement).
43. In some states this is referred to as a "summary process," see MASS. GEN. L. ch.
239, § 1-13 (1981 & Supp. 1990), or an "unlawful detainer" action. See CAL. CIv. PRoc.
CODE §§ 1161, 1179a (1982).
44. See MASS. ANN. LAWS, Unif. Summary Process R. 2(c) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (pro-
viding that trials be scheduled for the second Thursday following the entry date).
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unrepresented,45 this may be all the time it takes for a landlord to
obtain an eviction order.
By comparison, a represented tenant can make eviction a time-con-
suming and costly process. For example the tenant may be entitled to
a trial by jury" and time for discovery.47 If the tenant loses, he may
obtain a stay of the order pending appeal, which may add months or
even years to the landlord's wait. In the end, the landlord may decide
the wait is not worthwhile, and settle with the tenant, by either drop-
ping the action or paying the tenant to leave. Under some circum-
stances, the eviction may be blocked entirely.4"
In addition to the costs and delays of prosecuting the eviction, the
landlord also faces the possibility of a significant monetary counter-
claim by the tenant based on a breach of the IWH, or some other
requirement of the law.49 Depending on the severity of the breach
and the length of the tenant's tenure, this counterclaim can amount to
many times the tenant's monthly rent.50 If the landlord has intention-
ally ignored needed repairs, he may also be liable under the state's
Consumer Protection Act for multiple damages and attorney's fees."
As this discussion indicates, tenants in at least some jurisdictions
have considerable power to resist eviction actions. Endowed with the
appropriate legal resources, low income tenants can use this power to
45. In Great Green Hope, supra note 22, at 739-40, the authors found that only 23%
of all unlawful detainer actions filed by private landlords in the San Francisco municipal
court were contested. Similar figures were found in a study of Detroit's landlord-tenant
court. Id.
46. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (holding that seventh amend-
ment requires jury trials in eviction actions in District of Columbia).
47. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS, Unif. Summary Process R. 7(b) (Law. Co-op. 1990)
(allowing automatic postponement of trial for two weeks upon discovery request).
48. Only in "good cause" eviction jurisdictions is the warranty an actual defense
against any eviction. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); 1976
MASS. AcTs ch. 36, § 9 (barring evictions in Cambridge Rent Controlled Apartments
except for an enumerated list of just causes). In most jurisdictions, a tenancy-at-will may
be terminated at the pleasure of the landlord for any reason. Most implied warranty
jurisdictions, however, also provide that "retaliation" is a defense against any eviction.
See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 2A (1981) (creating a rebuttable presumption of retaliation
where landlord attempts to evict within six months of a tenant complaint or legal action
against the landlord); Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (requiring a legitimate business justification for evicting a tenant who appears to be
withholding rent to protest substandard conditions).
49. See supra note 41.
50. In one extreme case, a tenant in the Boston Housing Court obtained a judgment
for $61,475 against a landlord who intentionally harassed her and provided no utilities
for long periods of time. See Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 576 N.E.2d 658
(1991).
51. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 9 (1981); Wolfberg v. Hunter, 385 Mass. 390,
432 N.E.2d 467 (1982).
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their advantage in countering the economic power of the agents of
gentrification.
III. The Economic Implications of an Eviction Free Zone
A. Setting the Pessimistic Stage
The ultimate benefits of an EFZ strategy are not self-evident. Be-
cause the keystone of the EFZ strategy is enforcement of the IWH,
skeptics may point to the generally critical body of "law and econom-
ics" literature analyzing the likely consequences of broad-based en-
forcement of the IWH.52 Most mainstream economists take a hostile
view of the IWH, 53 characterizing it as well-intended but economi-
cally unsound. 4 Neoclassical economists generally maintain that en-
forcement of the warranty which imposes extraneous costs on
landlords produces a negative supply effect in the affordable housing
market.5"
52. See Abbott, supra note 28; Hirsch, supra note 22; Komesar, Return to Slumville:
A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82
YALE L.J. 1175 (1973); Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law
Institute, 27 STAN. L. REv. 879 (1975); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,
§ 16.8 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter Posner]; Rabin, supra note 26. Compare Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing
Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971) [hereinafter Ack-
erman I]; Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973) [hereinafter Ackerman II]; Markovits, The
Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes:
Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1815 (1976) [hereinafter Markovits];
Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: "Milking"
and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 485 (1987) [hereinafter Kennedy].
There are, of course, non-economic justifications of the implied warranty. See Keller,
Does the Roof have to Cave In?: The Landlord/Tenant Power Relationship and the Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 9 CARDOZO L. Rev. 1663 (1988); Mallor, The
Implied Warranty of Habitability and the "Non-Merchant" Landlord, 22 DUQ. L. REv.
637 (1984). Cf Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for
Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 Clv. RTS.- Civ. LIBERTIES L. REv. 557
(1988).
53. See Komesar, Meyers, and R. POSNER, supra note 52; Abbott, supra note 29;
Rabin, supra note 26.
54. Id.
55. This conclusion is based on the assumption that consumers interact with sellers in
a voluntary and rational way, that each individual is the best judge of his own needs, and
that each consumer will allocate funds towards different expenses in a way that produces
the most satisfaction. It follows that each person will purchase exactly as much of each
commodity (e.g., food, shelter, clothing) as is desired. Governmental interference with
this freedom to allocate income, however, produces "inefficiency." Individuals must
spend money on things that they do not want, and must reduce spending on those things
they prefer.
Not surprisingly, neoclassical economists believe the prevalence of slum housing to be
the result of rational and voluntary behavior on the part of landlord and tenant. They see
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The traditional analysis suggests that poor tenants, as a group, are
harmed because enforcement of the IWH decreases the supply and
increases the price of housing. Although other theorists suggest a
more ambiguous result,56 all standard economic analyses suggest that
enforcement of the IWH has, at best, a neutral effect on the supply of
the poor as unwilling or unable to offer enough rent to provide landlords with incentive to
voluntarily maintain buildings at a "habitable" level. Rental of subpar units is, according
to this view, an informed choice, not a result of the landlord's power over or fraud upon
the tenant. Any effort to disturb this voluntary exchange results in "misallocation" of
housing resources.
The imposition of an IWH disturbs this "voluntary" relationship between landlord and
tenant by increasing the landlord's maintenance costs. As a result, the critics argue, the
landlord is forced to pass some of these increased costs on to tenants in the form of higher
rent. Those tenants not able to afford the higher rents will be forced to either "double
up" or become homeless. Other tenants will remain in their units, but will have less
disposable income available for other (more desirable) expenditures. The inevitable result
is that tenants are forced to pay higher rents for improvements for which they did not
voluntarily bargain. For variations on this mainstream neoclassical attack on the IWH,
see Meyers and R. POSNER, supra note 52.
This kind of attack on the IWH is an instance of a more general critique of the regula-
tory state. See generally M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980).
56. See Komesar, supra note 52, at 1179-81; Markovits, supra note 52, at 1827-30.
See also Kennedy, supra note 52, at 498.
The ambiguity stems from the observation that it is impossible to know, a priori, how
the imposition of minimum standards will affect the "consumer surplus" generated in the
housing market. "Consumer surplus" refers to the surplus value achieved by consumers
(i.e., tenants) who would be willing to pay more than the clearing price for a commodity
(i.e., rental housing). See Hicks, The Rehabilitation of Consumer's Surplus, 8 REV. OF
ECON. STUD. 108 (1941).
Consumer surplus exists because not all tenants value (in an economic sense) apart-
ment quality in the same way. Some are willing or able to pay more for housing ameni-
ties than others. It is the marginal tenant, the one who values quality the least, who sets
the price. It follows that all of the other tenants, who would be willing to pay more for
what they are getting, receive a kind of windfall, or surplus, from the price structure of
the market. The amount of this surplus is the product of how much more the average
tenant values the existing level of apartment quality over the marginal tenant, times the
total number of tenants.
When the implied warranty is enforced, there are two likely effects. First, the con-
sumer surplus will probably shift because an improvement in the quality of housing
changes the amount that individuals are willing to pay for the units. This shift, however,
may not be uniform. Assuming the amount each tenant is willing to pay now is some
multiple of what she was willing to pay earlier, however, it is possible for consumer sur-
plus to have actually increased (for those tenants still housed) as a result of IWH enforce-
ment. In such a case, the remaining tenants would find themselves collectively better off
than they were earlier. See Ackerman I, Ackerman II, and Markovits, supra note 52.
The second potential effect is a problematic decrease in the number of units. One solu-
tion that has been suggested is the creation of a selective subsidy of those poorest tenants
who would otherwise be displaced by the decrease. Id. Such a subsidy, aimed at a small
subset of those tenants benefitting from IWH enforcement, would be far more cost effec-
tive (in terms of government expenditures) than the alternative posed by the neoclassical
economists of paying tenants directly so that they might afford higher quality housing.
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affordable housing.5 7
A pessimist might also observe that, while the EFZ strategy may
significantly delay or prevent many evictions, 58 no strategy will thwart
all of them. Those skeptical of the EFZ strategy might contend that a
constant external demand for gentrified housing will, over time, over-
whelm any local attempt to block the influx of gentrifiers. According
to this view, tenants who successfully resist evictions might gain a
short-term benefit from the EFZ,59 but resistance must eventually sag
as the ranks of original residents are whittled away by gradual
displacement.
Such a dismal prognosis may be a disincentive for community
groups and legal services providers considering whether to implement
an EFZ strategy. Certainly, an effective EFZ requires the allocation
of significant legal and organizational resources into eviction defense
and tenant education. If implementing an EFZ means only delaying
the inevitable, it may be more appropriate to put money and energy
into finding alternative housing for tenants. The following analysis,
however, demonstrates that this pessimistic outcome is not inevitable.
By examining the dynamics of neighborhood change in a gentrifying
market, this Article concludes that the EFZ strategy may be used to
block, entirely and permanently, the gentrification process.
B. An Alternative Understanding of Implied Warranty Terms:
Changing Power Relations Between Landlord and Tenant
This section presents an alternative model for understanding the
potential effects of an EFZ strategy. This model differs from the
traditional (and pessimistic) analyses in two important respects.
First, it assumes, contrary to the conventional analyses, tenants in
poor neighborhoods typically do not generally enforce the IWH on a
broad basis.6° Studies of both housing quality and tenant enforcement
rates indicate that tenants are unlikely to enforce the warranty on
their own, and that legal services agencies are unable to provide legal
representation to all tenants who might benefit from IWH
enforcement.61
Second, the alternative model presents a more complex understand-
ing of the mechanisms underlying the gentrification process. The
57. Id.
58. See Lazerson, supra note 42.
59. The tenant can benefit by staving off eviction, delaying it long enough to find
other accommodations, or by receiving a monetary settlement from the landlord.
60. Empirical studies of the use of implied warranties indicate that the IWH is not
widely enforced. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
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commonplace perception of gentrification is that it is an external
force, an invasion of a community by outsiders, propelled by regional
economic forces over which community residents have no control. 62
In this view, gentrification is a kind of natural force (the "tide" meta-
phor works well here), the prevention of which would require perpet-
ual and unrealistically effective resistance.
What the commonplace view fails to account for is the striking un-
evenness of gentrification. Typically, when gentrification strikes an
urban region, some neighborhoods gentrify while others, similarly sit-
uated, remain stable or even suffer a decline.63 While regionwide eco-
nomic forces certainly contribute to the gentrification process," these
forces do not determine which neighborhoods will gentrify.
The model presented here explains the unevenness of gentrification
by taking into account the "neighborhood effect" integral to the gen-
trification process; that is, the tendency of gentrification to sustain
itself by transforming the economic potential of the neighborhood in
which it occurs. When gentrifiers begin infiltrating a neighborhood, a
new dynamic, independent of regionwide economic forces, takes over.
The result is a "neighborhood effect," a kind of "positive feedback" in
the local housing market.65 The more gentrified a neighborhood be-
comes, the more profitable it becomes to gentrify the surrounding
area.
Recognizing the neighborhood effect in the gentrification process is
crucial to our analysis of the potential anti-gentrification effects of the
EFZ strategy. The view of gentrification presented here is not one of
an unstoppable onslaught, but of a process evolving over time. After
recognizing that the gentrification process has its own internal dy-
namic, we may then ask how the process may be disrupted. The re-
62. See, e-g. Smith, supra note 3, at 147-49 (arguing that gentrification is a response
to the falling rate of profit in developed suburbs and the undercapitalization of ground
rent in the inner city).
63. See Anti-Displacement Zoning and Connections, supra note 10.
64. See supra note 10.
65. A classic example of positive feedback, in a different context, is the "audio feed-
back" produced by public address systems. When a microphone is placed too close to the
loudspeaker to which it is connected, a familiar loud, high-pitched noise. is produced.
This noise is the result of positive feedback. The microphone picks up any small noise
and amplifies it through the loudspeaker. This amplified noise is picked up by the
microphone, which sends it through once again and makes it even louder. The process
continues over time until the noise is excruciatingly loud. A characteristic of most posi-
tive feedback systems is the extreme sensitivity of "output" to "initial conditions." Thus,
a slight change in the distance of the microphone from the loudspeaker determines
whether the high-pitched noise or merely silence will be produced. Similarly, in a poten-
tially gentrifying neighborhood, a very slight change in the initial conditions of price and
demand spells the difference between complete gentrification or long-term stability.
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mainder of this Article will analyze the degree to which an EFZ
strategy might undermine the self-perpetuating forces of gentrification
and ultimately preserve a neighborhood's stock of affordable
housing.66
C. The Economics of Gentrification: Uneven Impact and the
Undermining of Neighborhood Stability
Imagine a low income neighborhood ripe for gentrification. It is
comprised of a fixed geographical area and lacking many undeveloped
parcels. The neighborhood offers little potential for new housing con-
struction. Any increase in the number of housing units would require
removing or renovating existing housing units. The composition of
the neighborhood changes primarily through the gradual turnover.
The neighborhood is well-defined. Residents see themselves as liv-
ing "within" a recognizable area, and value the quality of life that the
neighborhood provides. Consequently, neighborhood conditions in-
fluence housing prices to some extent.
In its current condition, the neighborhood is run-down, but stable.
The housing stock is comprised primarily of old buildings which have
filtered67 down to low-income residents. The buildings are poorly
66. One previous analysis of the role of "neighborhood effects" in local housing mar-
ket dynamics was Duncan Kennedy's study of landlord "milking" in declining neighbor-
hoods. See Kennedy, supra note 52.
Kennedy proposed that the IWH be used selectively in a "declining neighborhood" to
prevent landlords from "milking." Id. at 489-90. Kennedy demonstrated that in a de-
clining neighborhood, (that is, one where housing prices are in constant decline), land-
lords will find that their most profitable course of action is to hasten the destruction of
their buildings by ceasing maintenance and to "milk" whatever value remains in them.
Landlords will do this because, as Kennedy illustrated, the constant decline in prices
inevitably makes the landlord's (shortened) rent stream without maintenance costs
greater than the (longer) stream obtainable from a maintained building. Id. at 490.
Kennedy's model predicts, therefore, that rational landlords in a declining neighbor-
hood will engage in anti-social behavior by purposely accelerating the decline of neigh-
borhood housing stock. Besides its obvious negative impact on tenants, this "milking"
phenomenon also damages the position of other landlords by accelerating the general
decline of the neighborhood, thus forcing them to "milk" as well.
In light of this analysis, Kennedy argues for enforcement of the implied warranty only
against landlords who engage in "milking." See id. at 499-501. He further argues that
such selective enforcement would produce economic effects different from those antici-
pated in the more traditional analyses; that is, selective enforcement would increase the
supply of housing while decreasing the price. Id. at 500-01. Such enforcement would
increase the supply of housing by preventing the premature abandonment of otherwise
healthy buildings. It would also decrease the price of housing because more units would
be available on the market. Additionally, by slowing the rate of abandonment, Ken-
nedy's scheme may slow, or even reverse, the neighborhood decline that initially induced
the abandonment. Id. at 502-06.
67. See supra notes 6-8.
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maintained and, in their present state, not desirable to affluent
tenants.68
What economic conditions might result in the gentrification of such
a neighborhood? Conventional economic analysis suggests that gen-
trification is the product of increased regionwide demand for high-
amenity urban housing.69 This theory has superficial allure, as there
are several factors which might explain such an increase. In a partic-
ular city, the increase might reflect growth in the white collar "FIRE
sector":7 0 the employees of FIRE sector industries often inhabit ur-
ban neighborhoods, proximate to the central business district. Re-
gionwide demand pressures might also be created by larger, long term
demographic trends. For example, the trend among "baby
boomers' ' 7' to defer marriage and eschew suburban life has increased
the demand for high amenity urban housing.72 When the general
trend outward and away from the city slowed, these high-income
renters began looking for homes closer to the city.
This conventional model of the gentrification process is shown
graphically in Figure 1:
68. We can say that the housing market is segmented by class into a high-income
market and a low-income market. Low-income renters do not buy gentrified housing and
potential gentrifiers ordinarily will not choose to live in low-income housing. Accord-
ingly, the high-income and low-income housing markets can be represented by two dis-
tinct pairs of supply and demand curves.
69. Alternatively, gentrification could be the result of changes in the cost of produc-
ing gentrified housing. For example, it could be the product of a "rent gap" which occurs
when the original cost of existing (old) structures has been fully amortized. At such a
point, the potential ground rent exceeds the rents obtainable from the existing structure
and it becomes cost-effective to renovate or reconstruct the building. This result is
equivalent to a one-shot increase in the supply of gentrified units, with similar effect. See
Smith, supra note 3, at 147-49.
70. See supra note 10.
71. The "baby boom" refers to the demographic "bubble" caused by the dramatic rise
in the number of births in the 1950's. People born during this period became adults in
the 1970's, and constitute what are commonly called the "yuppie" generation. See Baby
Bust, supra note 9, at 237-38.
72. See id. at 238-41.
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Figure 1:
Gentrification as a "One-Shot" Increase
in Consumer Demand Levels
Figure 1 expresses the supply and demand schedules for gentrified
housing, that is, old housing that has been repaired or renovated to
such an extent that it is suitable for gentrifiers. S is the supply curve
for gentrified housing. It is sloped upward to reflect the fact that
some units are easier to rehabilitate than others. Units most inexpen-
sive to convert will be the first to gentrify.
D is the demand schedule for gentrified urban housing prior to ma-
jor gentrification. It is sloped downward to reflect the fact that there
is a range of offering prices among potential buyers for gentrified
housing. D does not intersect S, reflecting the fact that it is not profit-
able to produce gentrified housing. D' is the demand schedule for
gentrified housing after an extrinsic change in the regional housing
economy. It is shifted up and to the right of D to reflect the fact that
after this change, an increased number of buyers are willing to
purchase gentrified housing at any given price (and any given buyer
will offer more for a given unit). The result of the shift from D to D'
is that both the price and quantity of gentrified housing increase.
Buyers along D' are willing to pay more for a given quality of housing
than those along D. Therefore some units (which could not have been
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profitably converted previously) have been added to the stock of gen-
trifled housing (at the intersection of D' and S).
This conventional demand-shift characterization of gentrification is
inadequate because it does not explain what is perhaps the most sali-
ent feature of gentrification: its apparently chaotic" and highly une-
ven quality. The demand-shift described above may explain the
existence of gentrification somewhere in a city; but it does not explain
why particular neighborhoods gentrify completely while others, simi-
larly situated, remain stable or even fall into decay.74
A model that explains why a particular neighborhood gentrifies
must take into account the neighborhood factors which contribute to
the demand for gentrified housing. The demand for gentrified hous-
ing, D,1' can be said to consist of two components: D(u) and D(n).
D(u) is the component of demand that reflects the regionwide desire
for gentrified housing units. D(n) reflects the impact of neighborhood
quality on the demand for units within the neighborhood. While D(u)
is a characteristic of high quality units throughout the region, D(n) is
a characteristic common only to those units within the neighborhood.
Thus, the price of an individual unit, assuming a constant supply
curve, is the result of two independent factors: the general demand
for a particular quality of housing in the region [D(u)], and the pre-
mium that buyers are willing to pay to live within the neighborhood
surrounding a unit [D(n)].76
73. See Beauregard, supra note 10 (describing the "chaotic" and fortuitous nature of
gentrification and criticizing purely "structural" theories for their inability to systemati-
cally predict those neighborhoods where gentrification actually occurs). See also R.
GOETZE, UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 59-63, 100-03 (1979) (describing
the vital role played by the creation of a positive image for Boston's Jamaica Plain and
Bay Village neighborhoods by "pioneers" in spurring on its eventual gentrification); D.
GALE, NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION AND THE POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY 10-13, 157-
59 (1984).
74. See supra note 73; Anti-Displacement Zoning, Connections, supra note 10.
75. It is important to be perfectly clear about what D represents. Although gentrified
units will in practice vary in quality, we make the usual economic assumption here that
gentrified units are of a uniform quality. D represents the schedule of offering prices for
one of these generic gentrified units within the neighborhood. D slopes down and to the
right because buyers who are more marginal will offer less for the same generic level of
housing quality.
It is also important to note that there is a distinct demand schedule for "non-gentri-
fled" units within the neighborhood, which are also assumed to be of a (lower) uniform
quality.
76. While the owner of a unit can control the first factor, he generally cannot directly
control the second. In fact, changes in neighborhood quality may be difficult to predict
and may be chaotic. See Beauregard, supra note 10. The term "chaotic" describes a class
of dynamic processes where extremely small changes in the parameters of the system
result in changes in output that cannot be easily characterized in terms of the original
alteration. It follows that it is impossible to predict the quality of future behavior within
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Returning to the low income neighborhood described above, prior
to gentrification, it is not economical to convert the existing (old and
dilapidated) units in the neighborhood to gentrified housing." The
neighborhood component of demand, or D(n), is low because, like
most low-income neighborhoods, this one suffers from typical inner-
city problems such as crime, poor services, and inconvenient shopping
centers. Most importantly for the purposes of gentrification, the
neighborhood has a "low-income character;" residents are, for the
most part, poor and have received little formal education. The combi-
nation of these factors makes the neighborhood undesirable for more
affluent urbanites.
For a developer to be induced to convert a unit, the profit from
conversion must be positive. The developer's profit equals the selling
price of the unit after conversion minus the sum of the pre-conversion
selling price and the cost of conversion. 8 If D(n) is sufficiently low in
the neighborhood, the price offered by potential gentrifiers for a con-
verted unit will be too low to justify the expense of conversion. Such
a situation exists in a non-gentrified neighborhood where landlords
have not taken steps to convert.
Neighborhood gentrification begins when marginal members of the
high-income class begin to relocate in the low-income neighborhood.
The "pioneer" gentrifiers will be relatively wealthy persons with a
high tolerance for low-income neighbors and for bearing the previ-
ously mentioned inconveniences (and dangers) of central urban living.
Why do the first gentrifiers choose a particular neighborhood? The
answer may be "chance." The factors that influence which neighbor-
hood will receive the first influx of gentrifiers are numerous. The par-
ticular facts will vary in each situation.79
What is important to note is that, once gentrification has begun in a
neighborhood, it tends to be self-sustaining.80 After the initial influx,
the reputation of the neighborhood improves and the neighborhood
becomes attractive to progressively more "mainstream" buyers. Real-
tors, speculators and community development officials, all having a
a chaotic system from studying its historical behavior. See generally J. GLEICK, CHAOS:
MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1988).
77. This is tautological. If conversion were profitable, it would have already
occurred.
78. The "cost of conversion" may include reconstruction or renovation, or may sim-
ply be the cost of evicting the existing tenants.
79. See Beauregard, supra note 10, at 40 (citing speculation, historic restoration, crea-
tion of a gay enclave, redevelopment of abandoned housing and conversion of warehouses
as possible underlying causes of gentrification).
80. Id. at 44-45.
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stake in the rapid transformation of the community, will do their best
to publicize "improvements" in the neighborhood in order to rehabili-
tate its image.81 Those with a lower tolerance for poor people than
the "pioneer" gentrifiers will be attracted to the increasingly "trendy"
environs. D(n) begins to increase. The price of housing in the neigh-
borhood increases as D(n) rises; consequently, more of the existing
affordable units become profitable to convert. As more gentrifiers
move in, lower-income inhabitants are forced out. This cycle rein-
forces itself as conversion of low-income units into high-income rent-
als and condominiums becomes more profitable and the rate of
conversion increases.
This cumulative process of gentrification can be understood in eco-
nomic terms by reference to Figure 2:
0(90) -
D'(60) _
D'(30)..
D'(10)..
O'(O) - . .
0(M)- .
P
0(0) * 0(30)' 0(90)
0(10) 0(60) Q
Figure 2:
Gentrification as a Gradual Self-Sustaining Process
In Figure 2, D(O) reflects the demand for gentrified units prior to
gentrification (the zero here represents the fact that there is not yet
any gentrified housing in the neighborhood). Because D(O) does not
intersect the supply curve S, no gentrified units are sold. D'(0) is the
81. See R. GOETZE, supra note 73; Beauregard, supra note 10, at 51-53.
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demand schedule after some external change in the housing economy
increases demand for gentrified units but no units have, as of yet, been
converted.82 D'(0) is high enough that some gentrified units can be
sold to early "pioneers" even though the neighborhood remains low-
income in character.
At this point, the neighborhood effect comes into play. After the
first few "pioneers" move in, the character of the neighborhood begins
to change. No longer just a "slum" in the eyes of potential inmovers,
it now comes to be considered "mixed-income" or "culturally di-
verse." This results in an increase in D(n), and a consequential fur-
ther shift in the demand for gentrified housing in the neighborhood.
This shift is reflected in the remaining demand curves on the graph.
D'(10) is the demand when the neighborhood is 10% gentrified,
D'(30) reflects a 30% gentrification level, and so on. As gentrifiers
move in, the neighborhood becomes increasingly desirable, producing
a further influx of "gentry."
This cumulative model explains the neighborhood-specific nature of
gentrification. Unlike the previous one-step model, this model dem-
onstrates that a relatively minor shift in housing market preferences is
all that is required to initiate the gentrification process. Once trig-
gered in a particular neighborhood, gentrification is self-sustaining.
Each new gentrifier entering the neighborhood makes further (and
eventually total) gentrification more likely by shifting the demand
curve upward.
Significantly, the initial shift in demand may be small enough so
that its effects are not felt uniformly among all neighborhoods in the
region. Once gentrification begins to sustain itself in one or two
neighborhoods, gentrifiers will flock to those "hot" areas. Other
neighborhoods, with equal gentrification potential, may, by chance,
not receive the initial influx of gentrifiers necessary to "get the ball
rolling."
It bears repeating that the market pressure that sets off the gentrifi-
cation process may be "large" or macroscopic, but the actual dynamic
that finally produces gentrification is "small" and takes place within
the neighborhood itself. The sale or rental price of units in the neigh-
borhood increases primarily because of a rise in the perceived quality
of the neighborhood, D(n), rather than an increase in the value of the
amenities offered in gentrified units, D(u). The increase in neighbor-
hood value attracts wealthier residents, who in turn accelerate the
"neighborhood effect" by "improving" the character of the neighbor-
82. I.e., when D(u) for the region increases.
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hood. As this process continues, more and more of the existing resi-
dents are priced out of the neighborhood and eventually the
neighborhood consists solely of higher income residents.8 3
While the gentrification process described above is self-sustaining,
it obviously cannot continue indefinitely. Once the neighborhood is
completely gentrified, the demand curve will stop shifting and prices
(absent additional external pressures) will stabilize. Of course since
not all neighborhoods reach 100% gentrification, it is possible that the
upward drift of the demand curve may stop at an earlier point. This
point, an "equilibrium point," is reached when the demand for gentri-
fled housing (generated by the existing level of gentrification) exactly
equals the number of already-converted units in the neighborhood.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the degree of neighbor-
hood gentrification and the demand for gentrified units by employing
a "cumulative demand function," or "CDF.''
83. This vision of neighborhood dynamics is inspired in part by Peter Marcuse, who
identifies the desire for "same-class" living as a cause of uneven patterns of gentrification
and abandonment. See Connections, supra note 10.
84. The format used here is borrowed from Thomas Schelling's study of the dynamics
of residential segregation. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATH. Soc.
143, 181-86 (1971) [hereinafter Schelling]. Schelling sought to understand the "white
flight phenomenon" in which all-white, apparently stable neighborhoods could experi-
ence a significant and rapid exodus of existing residents in response to the influx of a
relatively small number of non-white families. In particular, Schelling sought to solve the
riddle of why white flight occurred in neighborhoods in which typical residents appeared
relatively tolerant of non-white neighbors.
The model Schelling developed explained white flight as a feedback process, see supra
note 65. As non-whites begin entering a neighborhood, the most intolerant whites in that
neighborhood leave. This in turn encourages more non-whites to move in, which, in turn,
causes slightly more tolerant whites to exit. Depending on the distribution of tolerances
in a neighborhood, the process can continue indefinitely until even the most tolerant
whites leave.
To explain why some neighborhoods "tipped" like this while others remained stably
mixed, Schelling introduced the idea of a "tipping point." The tipping point is that per-
centage of non-whites in a neighborhood at which white flight becomes self-sustaining.
Schelling demonstrated that while the tipping point was related to the distribution of
racial tolerance among whites in the neighborhood, it need not be closely related to. the
tolerance of the typical resident. He concluded that tipping was, in a sense, a kind of
accidental event, not closely correlated to the prevalent degree of racism in a community.
A minor difference in the distribution of tolerances in a community could cause one
community to tip while another remains stable.
Schelling's model demonstrates how, in the context of racial tolerance, "neighborhood
effects" can produce a dynamic process that results in an eventual outcome not initially
desired by any of the original residents. The model presented in the Article is analogous,
with the distribution of tolerance for economic class, rather than race, determining neigh-
borhood market dynamics.
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Figure 3:
A Cumulative Demand Function Corresponding to the
Demand Shifts in Fig. 2
The CDF relates the percentage of gentrification in a neighborhood
(horizontal axis) to the "clearing quantity"8 5 for gentrified units in
that neighborhood (vertical axis). The 45i line represents hypotheti-
cal points at which the demand for gentrified units in the neighbor-
hood precisely equals the number already available.
The relatively steep sections of the CDF, between 10 and 30, and
between 60 and 90 on the horizontal axis, correspond to the wide gaps
between Q(10) and Q(30), and between Q(60) and Q(90) in Figure 2.
Because the difference between Q(30) and Q(60) is correspondingly
smaller, the slope of the CDF between 30 and 60 is more gradual.8 6
85. I.e., the quantity of units necessary to meet demand.
86. It should be emphasized that supply and demand curves presented in Figure 1 are
highly schematic. They are presented as parallel straight lines only for simplicity's sake.
The clearing quantities, while seemingly determined by the absolute position of the de-
mand curves, are in fact determined by the (possibly non-linear) shape and position of
both the supply and demand curves.
The uneven gaps between the various demand curves in Figure 2 are meant to indicate
that while there is a positive correlation between the level of gentrification and the de-
mand for gentrified housing in the neighborhood, it is not necessarily a linear one. For
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The CDF indicates the dynamic potential of the gentrification pro-
cess in a neighborhood by revealing its "equilibrium points." In a
CDF, equilibrium points correspond to all of the positions at which
the curve crosses the 45i line. In the above example, 30% is an equi-
librium point. When 30% of the neighborhood is gentrified, the result
is a demand for gentrified housing equal to 30% of the stock in the
neighborhood.
In the long run, a neighborhood can only sustain a gentrification
level equal to one of the equilibrium points on the CDF. When the
composition of the neighborhood corresponds to a point below the 45i
line, the demand for gentrified units is less than the existing number
of units; therefore, some of the units are likely to be abandoned or
converted back into low-income housing, or non-residential space. If
the neighborhood composition is above the 451 line, however, the de-
mand for converted units exceeds the supply; conversion into gentri-
fled housing will continue, and the level of gentrification will increase
until equilibrium is reached.
Two types of equilibrium points are possible on a CDF. One type,
illustrated by the 30% position above, is a stable equilibrium point. It
is stable because there will be a return to the equilibrium point despite
minor fluctuations in neighborhood composition away from equilib-
rium. So, for example, if the composition were to drop suddenly to
28% gentrified, the corresponding CDF point would be above the 451
line and conversion would increase until the 30% mark was reached.
If the neighborhood suddenly shifted to 32% gentrification, however,
the result would be the opposite. There would be an excess supply of
gentrified units, and some would have to be taken off the market, re-
turning the neighborhood to a 30% gentrification level.
The second type of equilibrium is unstable. The point at 75% in
Figure 3 is in an unstable position; any minor perturbation at this
point will drastically change the neighborhood. Moving to 74% will
result in a downward spiral that will not stabilize again until 30%;
moving to 76% will result in total gentrification. The dynamic signifi-
cance of these points is illustrated in Figure 4:
example, an initial small colony of "pioneer gentrifiers" may cause a sharp increase in the
desirability of the neighborhood, and a large shift in the demand curve. On the other
hand, later increases in the gentrification level may have a negligible effect on the reputa-
tion of the neighborhood, producing little or no increase in demand. A CDF which re-
flected this underlying economic potential would be steep in the lower levels of
gentrification and relatively flat afterwards.
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Figure 4:
An Example CDF Showing Stable and Unstable
Equilibrium Points
D. Gentrification as a Breakdown of Neighborhood Equilibrium
In our hypothetical neighborhood, before gentrification, we assume
that demand is at equilibrium. There are few if any gentrified units in
the neighborhood, and little demand for such units from the outside.
In order for gentrification to occur, equilibrium must be disrupted.
Such a disruption may occur in one of two ways. If the neighborhood
is at unstable equilibrium, as in Figure 5, it would require only a slight
perturbation in its level of existing gentrification to initiate an upward
spiral. This might be induced, for example, by an "urban renewal"
project creating a new high amenity development on the edge of the
neighborhood.
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Figure 5:
A Slight Perturbation at Unstable Equilibrium
Leads to Complete Gentrification
By comparison, a neighborhood in stable equilibrium can be dis-
rupted only by an external change altering supply or demand. As
Figure 6 illustrates, an overall increase in demand will produce a
CDF that is higher at any given level of G. This corresponds to an
upward shift of the CDF. Such a shift can remove a stable equilib-
rium point and initiate the gentrification dynamic previously
described.
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Figure 6:
A Shift Upward in the CDF Destroys an Equilibrium Point
In both of these cases (illustrated by Figures 5 and 6), the eventual
result of the initial disruption is the same: absent equilibrium points
to the right of the point representing the current (and now out-of-
equilibrium) configuration, the gentrification process will continue.
Neighborhood composition will move rightward on the CDF until
100% gentrification is achieved. 7
E. The EFZ as a Barrier to Gentrification: Restoring
Equilibrium
The previous discussion has illustrated that gentrification results
from the breakdown of a stable neighborhood configuration. It fol-
lows that anti-gentrification strategies such as EFZ will be effective if
able to produce stable equilibrium points corresponding to acceptable
levels of gentrification.
Although our analysis has heretofore focused on the effect of
87. Of course there may be, contrary to our illustration, an intermediate stable equi-
librium point. In such a case, gentrification would naturally abate, leaving the neighbor-
hood in a "mixed" configuration. Such an intermediate equilibrium point is illustrated in
Figure 4.
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changes in demand on CDF stability, we have noted8 8that the shape
of the CDF is also influenced by changes in the supply schedule, S, for
gentrified units. Just as an extrinsic shift to greater demand shifts the
CDF upward, an increase in the cost of supplying gentrified housing
can produce a more gently sloping CDF.8 9 The reason for this change
in slope is illustrated in Figure 7:
D'(90) - ,
D'(60)_
D'(30).-
D'(1o) - - __
0'(o) - ._
o- .
Figure 7:
An Upward Shift in the Supply Schedule Decreases
the Consumer Demand at Each Level of
Gentrification
S', a supply curve, reflects a progressive increase over S in the cost
of conversion of low-income units in the neighborhood. Here the val-
ues of Q represent the quantity of gentrified units demanded at vari-
ous levels of G. The values of Q', reflecting the new supply schedule,
change with respect to the original values of Q; the Q' values are
closer together and have decreased in magnitude. Because the spac-
88. See supra note 69.
89. Because clearing quantities at any given level of gentrification will be lower.
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ing of these Q' values determines the shape of the CDF, the curve will
possess lower values and will rise more gradually. Since the CDF will
be closer to the 45i line, it will be more likely to exhibit stable equilib-
rium points somewhere along its length.
Because an effective Eviction Free Zone strategy can produce an
increase in the cost of supplying gentrified units, shifting the supply
curve upward, it may be effective in returning a neighborhood to sta-
bility. An EFZ makes the first step in any conversion process - evic-
tion - costly. Before an EFZ is in place, tenants can be forced out of
the neighborhood with little trouble or cost. With an EFZ in opera-
tion, however, tenants may be able to delay, or even prevent, evic-
tions. As the neighborhood becomes known as an EFZ, potential
converters will include the high cost and uncertainty of eviction in
their profit calculus.' This will be reflected in a higher, steeper sup-
ply curve.
Figure 8 illustrates how an EFZ might successfully return a gentri-
fying neighborhood to stability. The graph contains three CDFs for
the target neighborhood. CDF1 is the CDF for the neighborhood
when it was stable. It is positioned below the 45i line; no danger of
gentrification exists. CDF2 is shifted upward from CDF1 as the re-
sult of an external increase in the demand. Finally, CDF3 is the CDF
that results after an EFZ has been effectuated, increasing the cost of
conversion. Two possible scenarios of preliminary gentrification fol-
lowed by countermeasures are illustrated in Figure 8:
90. This is especially true if the converter is a speculator rather than a long-term
landlord. The speculator is likely to have purchased the building at an inflated price with
a mortgage that cannot be repaid with the existing rents. The speculator must convert
the building quickly or he will lose this investment to the bank. Even if some evictions
are not challenged, owners will not know in advance whether they will be able to evict a
given tenant easily, and will have to include that risk in their cost projection.
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Figure 8:
3 CDFs -- Before Gentrification, During
Gentrification, and After the Application
of an EFZ
In the first sequence of events (indicated by the T points), the initial
rise in demand, indicated by CDF2, triggers a gentrification process.
No stable equilibrium points to the right remain. Thus, if nothing is
done, the neighborhood will gentrify completely.
At time T= 1, an EFZ becomes operational. The result is a shift to
a new CDF, CDF3. The new location of the neighborhood on this
CDF is indicated by T = 2. This point, however, is not stable; gentrifi-
cation will continue until the stable equilibrium point at T = 3 is
reached. The net result is that the EFZ has changed the fate of the
neighborhood from 100% gentrification (if it had followed CDF2) to
an acceptable 30% level of gentrification.
In the second scenario, the EFZ does not become operative until
much later. The neighborhood is approximately 70% gentrified at
T'= 1. Even with the application of the EFZ at this time, a shift to
CDF3 still leaves the neighborhood in disequilibrium at T' = 2; full
gentrification is inevitable at T'= 3.
1991]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
F. Judging the Effectiveness of the EFZ Strategy.
The preceding analysis illustrates that an EFZ strategy may be an
effective way to interfere with the de-stabilizing dynamic of gentrifica-
tion and, ultimately, to restore a neighborhood to a stable acceptable
mix of gentrified and non-gentrified housing. How effective an EFZ is
in practice will depend on factors particular to the housing market
involved. Of primary importance, of course, is the shape of the CDFs
for the neighborhood, before and after an EFZ is imposed. If the pre-
EFZ CDF reveals a stability point at some tolerable "mixed" level of
gentrification, the application of the EFZ strategy may not improve
the situation much. If the post-EFZ CDF is still too steep to reach
stability, an EFZ would prove entirely ineffective.
Ultimately, three factors determine the shape of the CDF: the size
of the pool of potential gentrifiers, the cost schedule for supplying
gentrified housing in the neighborhood, and the consumer preferences
of the gentrifying class. The size of the pool effects the CDF by influ-
encing the absolute level of demand at all levels of gentrification. All
things being equal, a larger number of buyers in the regional market9'
will produce a higher level of demand.
The cost of supplying gentrified units9 2 will also have an effect on
the shape of the CDF. For example, if some portion of the existing
stock of affordable units would be extremely expensive to convert to
gentrified stock,93 this would be reflected in a steep slope on a portion
of the supply curve, and a consequential trough in the slope of the
corresponding portion of the CDF.94
Finally, the inherent distribution of preferences for "gentrified liv-
ing"95 among potential gentrifiers will clearly have a direct impact on
the shape of the CDF. Suppose, for example one segment of the pool
of potential gentrifiers required only a low level of existing gentrifica-
tion to make a neighborhood very attractive, while another segment
would not react 96 very much until the neighborhood was highly gen-
trifled. In this situation, the CDF would reflect the bifurcated nature
of consumer preferences by exhibiting a steep section at low levels of
91. Such a change might be caused, for example, by growth in FIRE sector indus-
tries. See supra note 10.
92. Apart from any cost imposed by an EFZ.
93. These units might have extreme structural defects, asbestos, or lead paint, making
them very costly to convert.
94. The slope of the CDF would lessen at the point where additional gentrification
would require conversion of the hard-to-convert units.
95. That is, living in central urban areas with at least some mixture of economic
classes living in close quarters.
96. By offering higher prices.
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gentrification, a relatively flat section in the middle, and then a steep
section again at higher levels of gentrification. Conversely, if potential
gentrifiers were uniformly sensitive at all levels of gentrification, the
resulting CDF would be relatively constant in its slope.
EFZ proponents must also consider the question of timing. When
should an EFZ be introduced, and how long does it have to remain in
effect? As Figure 8 and accompanying text indicate, timing may be
crucial to ensure the effectiveness of an EFZ strategy. If the target
neighborhood has passed the point where stability can be restored
without complete gentrification, an EFZ will not be effective. Thus it
is clear that the sooner an EFZ is applied, the more likely its chance
of success.
A more complex issue to be considered is how long an EFZ should
remain in effect. The simple answer is that it should remain in place
as long as external pressures would destroy equilibrium in its absence.
In practical terms, determining the answer involves assessing the
strength of factors which led to gentrification in the first place: re-
gional economic pressures and the characteristics of the local neigh-
borhood. For example, if the regional economy were to enter a
recession, this might lessen the regional demand for gentrified housing
and bring the neighborhood back to equilibrium. On the local level,
the EFZ might, in addition to depressing the supply schedule for gen-
trifled housing, have the secondary effect of discouraging those agents
(i.e. speculators, realtors and community development officials) who
were promoting the original influx of gentrifiers97 in the first place.
Were the neighborhood to lose its long term appeal to gentrifiers, the
result could be a permanent reduction in the D(n) component of
demand.
An appreciation of the qualitative factors which affect the shape of
a CDF can assist EFZ proponents in assessing the potential effective-
ness of an EFZ strategy in a particular neighborhood. Although the
CDF is an abstract characteristic of a neighborhood's housing market
which cannot be measured in practice, it does provide a theoretical
framework for understanding how qualitative factors interact to cre-
ate the potential for gentrification, and the possibility of subsequent
stabilization. By analyzing population trends, consumer preferences
and conversion costs, EFZ proponents may begin to make informed
assessments about the potential efficacy of this strategy.
97. See R. GOETZE, supra note 73.
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V. Conclusion
The Eviction Free Zone strategy described in this Article may be
controversial, even among those who accept the economic analysis of
its effectiveness. The Article has not addressed, for example, the ethi-
cal, 98 professional responsibility99 and broader politicalleo issues that a
legal services attorney must consider before undertaking to apply the
EFZ strategy. Even from a purely economic perspective, there is no
guarantee of success for any particular attempt to block gentrification,
as the analysis here indicates.
What this Article has demonstrated is that tenants have a latent
power which can be used to offset the economic might of gentrifiers.
Because gentrification is not inevitable, but in fact results from a pro-
98. For example, it might be argued that the use of the implied warranty as an evic-
tion defense tool is an abuse of a law intended to remedy an entirely distinct social ill, and
that the only responsible manner in which to oppose gentrification is to appeal to the
legislature for anti-displacement legislation. One response to this argument is that the
"intent" of a law is never clear. See Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351,
391-98 (1973) (arguing that judges can never escape the need to make discretionary inter-
pretations of the law). Cf note 34 and accompanying text. Another view sees certain
types of legislation as the outcome of a kind of "contract" negotiated by various "interest
groups" in society. See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term: Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4-5 (1984). The implication of this
position is that judges should not look to "purposes" in interpreting laws, but should
rather understand them as a kind of "settlement" between two competing groups, with
no teleological content. It follows from either of these positions that litigants are not
bound by any clear standards as to the "appropriate" use of legal entitlements.
Another ethical issue to be considered is the impact that the EFZ strategy has upon the
non-wealthy members of the landlord class. At least in some neighborhoods, landlords
are not a class of wealthy exploiters, but long term neighborhood residents who have
saved sufficiently to buy a multi-family house and who are, in general, only slightly better
off than their tenants. See G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDON-
MENT: THE TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED xvi-xvii (1973). A reply to this critique
is that such landlords are only penalized under the EFZ if they attempt to capitalize on a
fortuitous windfall by evicting existing tenants.
99. Hostile judges may see participation in the EFZ as grounds for attorney disci-
pline. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a) and its state cognates, which provide for penalties
against attorneys who file frivolous pleadings.
100. The EFZ might, for example, backfire in the long run by mobilizing real estate
interests to change existing landlord-tenant laws, making it more difficult to enforce the
IWH under any circumstances in the future. See Lazerson, supra note 42, at 135-37. In
addition, a popular impression that EFZ tactics are unethical or counterproductive for
the long term health of the city may lead to divisions within the political support base of
the organizations attempting to implement it.
Once the appropriateness of using an EFZ is accepted, the question of what goals the
EFZ is intended to achieve remains open. As the foregoing analysis indicates, there may
be a number of stable demographic configurations which may result after an EFZ has
been applied. EFZ proponents must ask themselves whether they desire to prevent all
gentrification from occurring, or whether some stable "mixed" neighborhood is the pre-
ferred outcome.
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cess that is sensitive to minor perturbations in demand, it is suscepti-
ble to attack by grassroots activists. Because gentrification is a
process that occurs within a neighborhood, and not just a force im-
posed from without, neighborhood residents have the ability to alter
the course of that process and take some measure of control over their
environment.

